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ESSAY
The Jurisprudence of Comparative
Legal Systems
STEPHEN C. HICKS*

Comparative law had traditionally been thought of as a method
without substantive import. However, comparative law is now recognized as having a contribution to make to both international law
and order, and the study of legal history, anthropology, and philosophy.' The common ground between the ideal of a world law and
the totality of legal theory is, in fact, the province of comparative
law. Comparative law, however, has always been subject to competing claims of authorities in setting appropriate boundaries for its
study. Current interest in comparative law reflects an awareness of
its profound importance. The author's intention is to review the
changed perspective resulting from this renewed interest by defining
the boundaries of comparative law and by explicating the importance
of this new perspective for legal theory.
The focus in comparative law has changed from a narrow technical emphasis with general classifications of families or styles of law
into a more unified historical, cultural, and practical perspective. A
study of comparative law has evolved into a study of legal systems. Therefore, the author prefers the phrase "comparative legal
systems" rather than "comparative law" as a descriptive title for this
field of study. The significance of this evolution not only has consequences for legal theory, but involves legal theory.
The change in focus of comparative law is part of a reorientation
of legal theory from the study of rules and concepts of law to the
study of the experiences of legal systems as social orders. History,
anthropology, and philosophy contribute to this reorientation. Hence,
* B.A., 1971, Downing College. Cambridge, England: LL.B.. 1972. Downing
College. Cambridge, England; LL.M., 1977, University of Virginia. Member, State Bar
of Ohio. Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, Boston. Massachusetts.
I. On being merely a method, see Hamson, H.C. Gutteride of Cambridge, 3
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 377 (1954). See also Green, Comparative Law as a "Source" of
International Law, 42 TUL. L. REV. 52 (1967); Green, Comparative Law Contributions to
the International Legal Order: Common Care Research, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 615 (1968):
Watson. Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313 (1978).
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the goal of comparative law as a universal system of law and order
has been, and hopefully, always will be a source of inspiration to all
concerned.
The "jurisprudence of comparative legal systems" connotes how
the subject matter of law has taken shape when viewed from a comparative perspective. The perspective and subject matter are obviously interrelated so that as one changes, it affects the other. 2 Therein
lies the key to the development of comparative law in the narrow
sense of jurisprudence, and in the wider sense of legal theory. At
the Congress of Comparative Law in Paris in 1900, alternative concepts of comparative law emerged, one from Saleilles and one from
Lambert. Saleilles' perspective was practical while Lambert's was
intellectual. To Saleilles, the potential of comparative law lay in a
legislative common law, "un droit iddal relatif." To Lambert, comparative law was useful to discover the natural laws of legal development through "la vie juridique. "3 The dynamic confrontation between comparative study for the narrow purpose of developing an
international, transnational or common law in a scientific or instrumental sense, and comparative study for the purpose of describing
and accounting for the relationship between law and society, either
from an evolutionary or existential perspective, has enabled comparative law to defy labeling and categorization. This has been its latent
strength. Today, apparently these distinct approaches are not seen
as alternatives, but parts of a consistent whole. The fact that comparative law incorporates such widely divergent studies as those of a
particular branch of law of a particular foreign system or the relationship between families of legal systems proves that comparative
law is not merely a method, but rather, it unites all the selective
2. For example, one form of classification used "vertical" and "horizontal" approaches. An example of the former might be historical legal systems while the latter would
be contemporary. Mayda, Some Critical Reflections on Contemporary Comparative Law,
39 REV. JUR. P.R. 431, 453 (1970). However, the horizontal approach could be described
as a survey, whereas the vertical approach would necessitate a thorough immersion into a
branch of law of a particular country. Kozolchyk, Comparative Legal Study - Another
Approach, 14 J. LEGAL EDUC. 367, 379 (1962). The approach is meaningless without
reference to its field of study. The different uses of such terms as "vertical" and "horizontal" only serve to warn of the danger of regarding different emphases as matters of mere
opinion. The relationship of perspective to a field of study implies more than a mere matter
of taste.
3. H. GUTTERIDGE, COMPARATIVE LAW 5 (2d ed. 1949). J. HALL, COMPARATIVE
LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 17 (1963). See also, Kamba, Comparative Law: A Theoretical
Framework, 23 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 485, 488 (1974); K. ZWEIGERT & H. KoTz, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 1-2 (T. Weir trans. 1977).
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disciplines of legal theory. Such disciplines include legal anthropology, legal history, the sociology of law, and political science,
together with the creative discipline of international law, in a study
of the very relationship between rules of law and the conception of
law.
The persistent debate concerning the origin of "comparative
law" is tied to the relationship between perspective and subject
matter. However, it is more complex than the contrast between theory
and practice. For example, it can be said, that the debate began with
the study of primitive law. Pollock believed that it made no difference
whether one talks of comparative or historical jurisprudence, since
the expectation was to discover universal principles in the development
of law. Such principles include Maine's famous dictum that "the
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement
from status to contract. "4 Yet, in Pollock's own words, comparative
jurisprudence was significant as "a handmaid to the theory of legislation." 5 From Plato to Montesquieu, it was this which served to
distinguish the modern practice from all other applications of the
comparative method. Although at first comparative law was viewed
from a distinctly idealistic and metaphysical historical perspective, it
was conceived as a new branch of legal science with a practical end,
the subject matter being the universal principles of positive law .6 This
ambiguous interplay of the universal and the empirical was a result
of the application to law of the distinct influences of the comparative
method and the idea of evolutionary progress. 7
The comparative method was hailed as an intellectual advance
4. Pollock, The History of Comparative Jurisprudence in ESSAYS IN THE LAW
(E. Pollock ed. 1922 reprint 1969). H.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100 (1861 & reprint 1917).

See also, HALL, supra note 3, at 16.
5. Pollock, supra note 4, at 1, 2.
6. For example, see Comte's division of history into theological, metaphysical, and
positivistic changes. A. COMTE, THE POSmVE PHILOSOPHY [1830-1842](Martineau trans.

1896). See Maine's movement of progressive societies from status to contract. H. MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 170 [1861 ] (Dutton trans. 1972). Lastly, Spencer's evolution of society from
a primitive military hierarchy to the individually and socially integrated industrial state. H.
SPENCER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY [1876-1886](Appelton trans. 1910).

On the other

hand, note for example Maine's statement that "the chief function of comparative jurisprudence is to facilitate legislation and the practical improvement of the law.' H. MAINE,
VILLAGE COMMUNITIES 4 (1871).

7.

For example, Pollock refers to J. Austin's On the Uses of the Study ofJurisprudence

in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 365 (1863 & reprint 1954). However,

according to Austin, comparative jurisprudence was not concerned with the utility of legal
principals - only the descriptive and analytic. Pollock also refers to Darwin. Id. at 25.
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as great as the revival of Greek and Latin learning. It was expected
that the comparative study of law would reduce its data to generalized
propositions arrangeable according to the essential characteristics of
concepts and categories as if, like species, they were objectively real
and independent of both function and social context. 8 Indeed, as early
as 1854, a major study of the commercial laws of the world concluded
with a proposal to unify commercial law by international conferences. 9 Although by the time of the Paris Congress of Comparative
Law in 1900, the idea of the possible unification of European private
law had taken hold, it never quite eclipsed the underlying sense of
comparative or historical jurisprudence because unification required
progress and evolution. It has taken two world wars and their qualified successes in international political cooperation to undermine the
faith in progress which historical change implied. Today, legal history is used to determine the relationships among legal systems, and
not to unfold the idea of law. Similarly, the formal analysis of rules
of law has been replaced today by a cataloguing and systematizing
of laws and solutions which will possibly lead to a universal
law. However, this cataloguing has not demonstrated the reality of
legal concepts, but rather how legal concepts depend on society and
culture. As a result, the realization of a unification of law has been
left to the piecemeal development of transnational law. In fact, it is
the underlying and original sense of comparative law as comparative
jurisprudence that has come to the fore again. The subject matter of
comparative law is as likely to be society, culture, or tradition, as
rules of law, but the practical end of its application to international
society seems very remote.
The different conceptions of comparative law that have evolved
since the early nineteenth century remain to form the framework of
the field of study today.' 0 There is, therefore, a tension between
science and history as the legitimate cornerstones of comparative law;
between its practical and its theoretical value and between a superficial
8. HALL, supra note 3, at 125 (quoting W. WHITNEY. THE LIFE AND GROWTH OF
LANGUAGE: AN OUTLINE OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE (1875)), and at 131 (quoting E. FREEMAN,
COMPARATIVE POLITICS (1873)).
9. ZWEIGERT & KoTz, supra note 3, at 49, referring to LEVI, COMMERCIAL LAW OF
THE WORLD; or, THE MERCANTILE LAW OF THE UNITED KINGDOM COMPARED WITH THE
CODES AND LAWS OF THE (58) FOLLOWING MERCANTILE COUNTRIES. AND THE INSTITUTES OF
JUSTINIAN (1854).

10. Kozolchyk, Trends in Comparative Legal Research, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 100,
109 (1976). ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 3, at 54. M. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEo-COLONIAL LAWS 14 (1975).
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and an unscientific analysis of incomparable details. It remains true
that comparative law is at the experimental and innovative stage and
has perhaps suffered from the ambitions of its originators. 1 But it
is also true that whether the intent is descriptive, identificatory, explanatory, or reformative, there is a relationship between the subject
matter and the perspective adopted toward law as a whole. Moreover,
this relationship is itself a jurisprudential matter. Thus, the two extremes of comparative law are easy to identify. Either it should include "as much as is possible . . . of all peoples and all times,"' 2 or
it should be limited to the law as seen "from within and in itself
rather than in relation to other human standards of conduct."' 3 Any
possible area of research can therefore be mapped out, in a pure sense,
as a method and no more. However, such research will necessarily
involve a part of every branch of law. In a less pure sense, that would
involve segments of legal systems such as procedural law. The avowed
intent here, however, is not to study functions or social contexts, but
to discover common concepts. Alternatively, impure comparative
law might compare whole systems, thereby revealing styles of
law. This approach would act as a prelude to a classification of the
whole legal universe into families and types of law. 14 Obviously,
when viewed in this way, comparative law can, with justification,
lend itself to the study of other methods and techniques of law. These
other methods include the study of different sources and structures of
law, of one area of law in different systems, of one system as a social
whole, or even of the overall relationships between legal systems,
because the very nature of law itself encompasses not merely rules,
principles, and concepts, but also systems of social order.
Each way of exploring and defining the field of comparative law
involves very real dangers. Much of the academic literature bears
out the vested interests its participants have felt in defending their
approach, practical or theoretical, from attack. The functional
11.

Tallon, Comparative Law: Expanding Horizons, 10 J. Soc. Pu13. TCHRS. L. 265

(1969).
12.

Wagner, Research in Comparative Law: Theoretical Consideration, in ESSAYS
511. 517 n. I (R. Newman ed. 1977) (quoting
Del Vecchio. Les Bases du droit compar& les principles ginraux du droit, 12 REV. INT.
DEV. COMP. 493. (1960)).
13. Wagner. supra note 12, at 531 (quoting Sereni, On Teaching Comparative Law,
64 HARV. L. REV. 770, 776 (1951)).
14. ZWEIGERT & KoTz. supra note 3. at 56-57. See also Wagner, supra note 12. at
IN JURISPRUDENCE IN-HONOR OF ROSCOE POUND
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approach, which involves comparing legal systems on the basis of
their solutions to relatively similar problems, has the distinct disadvantage of tending to equate unequals. 15 As a corollary, it can be
argued that such comparison must be limited to systems at the same
stage of evolution. Thus, only rules which are part of some positive
legal order can be compared. Such comparison must be based on their
role rather than their doctrinal significance. This approach automatically invalidates a more general and theoretical approach beginning
with the system as a whole. The same point can be made in a different
way. As a tool of reform, comparative law is limited due to its
political nature because only in exceptional cases can law be transplanted. The utility of comparative law is not that it leads to the
adoption of foreign solutions, but rather that it teaches the variety of
solutions that exist. At the most, general or common principles seem
possible. The macro-perspective of the historian or anthropologist is
immediately suspect, while the lawyer's descriptive or analytic study
is validated. 16 The premise that rules alone are the data of law results
from nineteenth century legal science and its progeny, the case
method. However, neither cases nor the function of rules constitute
law. The law is the very process of decision making, with all the
sociological, historical, and philosophical implications surrounding
constitutive processes. Thus, the choice of focus between theory and
practice depends little on the end of adapting law, or comparing
doctrine or social function, but on the conception of law. The functional approach, therefore, puts doctrinal rules into a systematic context, but does not necessarily put the system into a social context.' 7 Thus, we assume we may have a conception of law in the
examination of our own legal system, though the Jurisprudence of
15. Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TUL. L. REV. 325, 329
(1951). ZWEIGERT & Korz, supra note 3, at 36, 39.
16. On the debate concerning "Legal transplants," see generally Stein, Uses, Misuses
and Non-uses of ComparativeLaw, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 198, 203-04 (1977). See also KahnFreund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 11 (1974). Cf.
Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79, 82 (1976). The issue
of the relationship of perspective and field of study is also evident here, since the contrast
between function and doctrine does not have to match the contrast between lawyer and
anthropologist.
17. LePaulle, The Function of Comparative Law with a Critique of Sociological Jurisprudence, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838, 853 (1922). See also M. HOOKER, LEGAL PLURALISM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO COLONIAL AND NEO-COLONIAL LAWS 42 (1975) ("IT]he law itself is made
up of concepts plus referents; a demonstration in similarity of function of the latter does not
necessarily imply the same supporting epistemology").
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Comparative Legal Systems tends to reveal its limitations. However,
we cannot assume to define another law even as duly constituted
without knowing the significance of it in the context of the legal
process or its meaningfulness as part of the social order.
This confrontation between the practical and theoretical is composed of a dynamic interaction of three focal points of study within
the field of comparative law: the forms of law, the forces behind the
functional reality, and the processes of expression of those forces in
a historical and philosophical sense. Thus, it was quickly understood
that the functional approach would reveal relationships between precepts, techniques and ideals.18 The comparison of solutions and the
appreciation of alternative methods and principles is but the first,
albeit necessary, step to understanding foreign law, for that entails
the analysis of which social forces, ideals, and values have formed
the methods and solutions of law. These influences also have historical and philosophical dimensions which are part of their significance. Hence, the legal theories and the process of development of
a legal system are as important to its comparative understanding as
are the very rules themselves. Both the practical and the theoretical
share the danger of losing sight of each other. What binds the two
approaches together is this unity of the field of study; the forms of
law, the values they express, and the process of their development
comprise systems of law as social order. The practical/theoretical
dichotomy therefore simplifies the divergencies within comparative
law. It contrasts "law" with "laws," whereas the real contrast is
between law as the sum of laws and law as a system of social order. Whether the focus of study is on functions and forms, social
forces and ideals, or the historical and philosophical processes of legal
development, the value ascribed to each focus is both practical and
theoretical. From the perspective of law as a part of social order,
knowing what the law is also means knowing its application and
usefulness. The two categories of the practical and theoretical are in
fact mediated by a third: the idealistic.
Contemporary comparative law is part of the emergent humanistic awareness of the significance of cultural relativity and the limited
shared resources of the world. Appreciating how various other legal
systems interpret social order may minimize ethnocentricity and the
prejudice and destructiveness exhibited as a result of imperial
18.
(1955).

Pound, Comparative Law in Space and Time, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. 70, 76, 83
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self-conceptions of law.' 9 This humanistic purpose of comparative
law goes deeper than the deprovincializing of the mind toward domestic law. Such a purpose is also a means of generally understanding law and order, and thus, human nature and the bonds that unite
man in the search for Justice. 20 It implies a global outlook on world
problems so as to bring people face to face with their cultural essence,
and with the essence of the various cultures in the world. This purpose
also implies a faith in the universality of law as social order. In the
study of law, we come to know ourselves as social animals, dependent
for recognition of our individuality on the mediating forces that let
us see ourselves in other people and themselves in us. Through Man's
very existence in the world with others, through his example and the
expectations he generates, he reveals the Law's meaningfulness.
It is from an appreciation of this deeper value to comparative
law that its usefulness, theoretically and practically, makes sense and
can be given direction. The result of clarification of one's own law,
and the development of a critical awareness of one's own law are not
merely seen in the reform of law, but in the work toward the unification
of law through common principles and their harmonization. 21
However, this must have a special sense. The idea of common
or universal principles of law is only part of the story. It can only
be realistically hoped for if it is fitted to the uniqueness of the world
of international society, which is not structured vertically or coercively, nor is it centralized. 22 Thus, the humanistic impulse to see
in law some general features of human nature and social organization
necessitates not only the practical study of rules, systems, and normativity, but the theoretical study of what law is, for the common
law-the core concept of Western law-is no more an acceptable
model of law for an international legal order. But it is with comparative law's deeper value that there is most confusion. This confusion reflects a failure to grasp the perspective of comparative law
as it regards the correlation between law and society, and to apply it
to the field of study which includes its forms, values, and processes
19. Pound. The Place of Comparative Law in the American Law School Curriculum,
8 TUL. L. REV. 161, 166 (1934); cf. von Mehren, Roscoe Pound and Comparative Law, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1585, 1588-90 (1965).
20. Kamba, supra note 3, at 505. See also R. UNGER. LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 137
(1976); Hall, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 61, 66 (1966).
21. ZWEIGERT & KoTz. supra note 3, at 40.
22. Watson, A Realistic Jurisprudence of International Law, 34 Y.B. WORLD AFF.
265, 266 (1980). Hicks, International Order and Article 38(I)(c) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, 2 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1, 11 (1978).
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of development. Thus, the ideal of a unified law must proceed upon
an awareness of the nature of the legal experience of social order. Comparative law can realistically achieve this awareness. This
is comparative law as legal humanism. It is properly jurisprudential
for the organization of the materials of comparative study to lead to
some conception of law as the experience of order, rather than universal or common rules of law. But more importantly, it means that
the essence of jurisprudence is actually comparative jurisprudence as
Austin himself realized long ago (though for different reasons). The
desire to know law and see it in its human sense as a manifestation
of order is the realization of comparative legal systems.
Certainly this is a wide claim. Others have claimed a similar
importance for comparative law. For example, Hall has suggested
that anthropology, political science, and sociology of law may form
a single legal discipline because legal norms are of primary significance to social action. 23 It has been said that the utility of comparative
law is architechtonic, so that no empirico-inductivist knowledge is
possible without its general types. 24 Thus, Lawson claimed comparative law could verify results obtained by theoretical analysis.25 Jurisprudence and comparative law effectively form the two
essential moments of legal knowledge: content and form.2 6 But of
the two, it is jurisprudence (form) that cannot exist without comparative law. 27 Moreover, a hundred years ago, Jhering said, "comparative jurisprudence is the method of the future theory of
law." 2 8 Thus, the essence of comparative law is jurisprudence. The
fundamental question of the nature of law as the social experience of
order renders coherent its study, is whether that study is directed to
the unification of law or to mere functional comparison. 29 It has its
own jurisprudence for the changing meaning of comparative law over
the years is a reflection of the alternative perspectives and subject
matters thought appropriate to it. The essence of jurisprudence is
comparative in its fundamental question concerning the nature of law;
23. HALL, supra note 3, at 111-12, 117.
24. Tur, The Dialectic of General Jurisprudence and Comparative Law, 22 JURID.
REV. 238, 245, 248 (1977).
25. 2 F. LAWSON, THE COMPARISON, SELECTED ESSAYS 59 (1977).
26. Tur, supra note 24, at 249.
27. Kamba, supra note 3. at 494.
28. Geist d. romischen Rechts, Introduction No. 1, quoted in Mayda, supra note 2,
at 438 n. 17.
29. HALL, supra note 3, at 7, II. "The question of what is comparative ....
It
is, instead, a jurisprudential problem." Id. at 7.
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a question about the meaningfulness of the human experience of order
in society. This is an historical, sociological, anthropological, and
philosophical study. Comparative law makes each of these disciplines view their subject as the whole.30 Moreover, comparative law
offers a total overview which none of the other disciplines of law do
since comparative law has within itself the dynamic interplay between
the search for common and general principles of law, and the processes
and causes of legal development, both of which are grounded in the
basic conception of the experience of law. This is the meaning the
author ascribes to Comparative Legal Systems.
The idea of systems of law involves more than the substance and
procedure of law, its rules, techniques, and styles; it involves the
relationship of the whole to itself, as an internally consistent form of
rational expression of ideals of order or justice, and also an external
perspective of how the whole of law, as defined internally, relates to
the whole of society. The interrelatedness of both can only be interpreted from the viewpoint of the life of a participant in the society,
rather than from that of a practitioner or an observer. Given an
adequate concept of legal experience (i.e. law as a way of being)
which hopefully unites perspective and field of study in a humanistic
way, the given structural features and the open phenomenological
variables of any legal system may be described, whether at the level
of rules, categories, systems, or families of law. It is only from this
viewpoint that the function of comparative law can be realized because
the jurisprudential question, "what is law?" is preceded by, "who
is it who asks?" Comparative law asks not for a fact, but for the
meaning of the relationship between human beings and the law. The
author suggests moreover, that an appreciation of this method of study
can be discerned in certain changes in the textbooks in the field. The
scope of comparative law is widening to include the notion of the
whole legal world and its intellectual development. Its perspective
is changing too, from an instrumental or evaluative one to an interpretative one, which concerns the meaningfulness of different forms
of life or modes of existence. 3
30. Kuhn, The Function of the ComparativeMethod in Legal History and Philosophy,
13 TUL. L. REV. 350, 361 (1961).
31. Thus, von Mehren's second edition of The Civil Law System "devotes substantially
more space" to Western legal philosophy prior to the nineteenth centrury. A. VON MEHREN
& J. GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM ix (2d ed. 1977).

In the book by J. H. Merryman

and D. S. Clark entitled Comparative Law: Western European and Latin American Legal
Systems, a distinguishing feature of the approach is said to be "a greater attention to ...
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A complete study of comparative law, therefore, would include
a consideration of the interplay between law, society, and politics,
with some overview of the theories and possibilities of social change
and evolution. It would obviously cover Western philosophical, religious, and simple legal systems, for each connotes a different mode
of making meaningful the experience of living in an ordered whole.
It would analyze the forms and functions of their rules, the social
forces and values at work, their theories and self-concepts of the legal
system. If there are universal qualities to the relationship of law and
society, they are as likely to be found in the classical law of ancient
Greece, Rome or India, as in their modem progeny. Therefore, ancient, classical and medieval legal systems are relevant in the nature
of legal experience because these systems are part of the whole complex of law and order. Finally, a view of the emergence of the modem
State and its law needs to be developed from a practical, historical,
and philosophical sense to set the stage for either the identification
of what constitutes our Anglo-American conceptions of law, or the
identification of the universal and the general disputes as discrete
cases. Thus, any particular concept of law is rooted in and grows
out of historical contingency and its interpretation. It can only be
seen in its essence from the perspective of its relationship to other
self-conceptions of law as the way law is experienced. Comparative
Legal Systems must not only accept the notion that legal systems
form traditions, cultures, or families, but also must find some means
to account for the very significance of law, ontologically, as well as
logically and historically. Only with such an overview can the idea
of the field of study, as inclusive of the forms of law, the forces
underlying them and their processes of development, and the perspective of the search for the meaningfulness of order in society be
accomodated, whether or not the ultimate end of comparative law is
the discovery of universal qualities to the experience of law alone or
intellectual history" among other things. "lIlt is seldom the rules of law that are truly
significant or interesting about a foreign legal system; it is the social and intellectual
climates." Secondly, the new book by M. A. Glendon, M. W. Gordon and C. Osakwe
is entitled Comparative Legal Traditions because among legal systems, rather than substantive law, there are constants that can serve to group and organize them into families. M.
GLENDON, M. GORDON & C. OSAKWE. COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 2, 10 (1982). The
basic text in this field has always been R. DAVID & J. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD TODAY (1978). Finally, note that M. Cappelletti and W. Cohen in their book
Comparative Constitutional Law (1979) at vii, talk of "legal cultures," as do J. Barton, J.
Gibbs Jr., V. Li, and J.Merryman in their Law in Radically Different Cultures (1983), and
G. Dorsey in his unpublished materials on Jurisculture.
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as a preliminary to the creation of some universal law.
On the one hand, such an overview combines the analytic, sociologic, anthropologic, historic and philisophic perspectives with
their appropriate normative, factual, and interpretive fields of
study. On the other hand, it is more than a grand overview because
it focuses on the very idea of order in society. It is a humanistic
endeavor because the experience of order in society may be the one
attribute universal to human beings and because it leads man to ponder
the role of law in' social organization as a way of our being human. Perspective and field of study, therefore, come together not so
much in the combination of all possible approaches, but because these
approaches lead to the same question: How do societies make meaningful the experience of order through law? Thus, the perspective is
that of the search for the significance of experience, while the field
of study is that of the experience of order. But Comparative Legal
Systems is humanistic in another way. In this Jurisprudence of Comparative Legal Systems, as in the experience of law itself, it is necessary to recognize the dynamic interplay of structure and openness,
of the given and the created. Just as law is not wholly objective, as
the rules or systems are often represented, neither is it wholly subjective. But from the point of view of the person in society who is
involved with the law, law is experienced as a partial, avoidable,
ambiguous and contingent order. The facts to which the rules of law
apply are made in the process of existence, and their meaning is
contingent on a human drama, not a legal one. No one is a law unto
himself, but neither is the law wholly without a human aspect. We
start with a personal, not a private sense of the law. In this way, our
humanity is incorporated into the law. We are responsible for the
law as it has shaped our society. But the more objective the selfconception of law in a legal system, the more the person who is
actually involved in the law is alienated from the legal person as seen
by the law. In other words, alienation is a function of the reification
of concepts, such as law, which eliminates the openness and creativeness of existence to the thinking of law in terms of rules, functions,
and traditions without the appreciation for the experience of law as
a way of being in society.
Alienation is a world, legal and personal, problem. Humanistic
and idealistic comparative law is devoted to this problem. We are
able to accept and acknowledge incredibly diverse moral codes because of the relative universality of law. This acceptance enables us
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to classify the law into families by the functional similarity of
rules. The diversity of legal systems and their political and social
implications is a stumbling block to an international system because
we do not appreciate the relative universality of order in society that
would put legal systems into perspective. The key idea here is the
experience of law as a part of the social order. We think of this
experience as a formal and rational system of rules of instrumental
value, neutral as between the ends of wealth, efficiency or happiness,
but involved in the means of protecting the free exchange or alienation
of the deemed necessary attributes of the person: the possession of
conscience, speech and property. The framework is essential, but
the substance is contingent upon it. This is not only true analytically,
but actually, for the substance of the law is not merely the givenness
of rules but the openness of the experience of rules in concrete situations where law may be ignored, bent, made, or found as well as
simply broken or applied. Thus:
[D]ispute settlement, for instance, became identified with law
enforcement, law enforcement with sanctions, sanctions with punishment and punishment with guilt, until the lawyers were convinced that the punishment of a guilty offender for the breach of
a legal norm would settle the social dispute between, for example,
a thief and his victim. The extraordinary transformation of a
multi-dimensional social dispute into a two-dimensional legal dispute and the even more extraordinary re-transformation of a twodimensional legal solution into a multi-dimensional social solution
became accepted as fact .32
The emphasis, therefore, of Comparative Legal Systems is more on
social order and law's place within it, than on law itself. Law is
applied all the time. The idea of the application of law is constituted
by principles or intellectual phenomenon.
This is certainly in keeping with much contemporary critical
jurisprudence which puts such a concept of law into the perspective
of liberalism as a particular rendering of the relationship of self, others
and whole. Thus, the given aspect of law as an objective reality
may be said to reduce the interplay of value with fact, desire with
reason, or right with rule. 33 We usually regard such a reduction as
32. Sack, The Cult of the Eight Foot Yam: Primitive Provocations on Law Developnent in LAW AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY 326 (F. Hurtley. E. Kamenka. A. Ehrsoon
Tay eds. 1979) with reference to Quintus Mucius Scaevola.
33. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 63-103 (1975)(Society places
restraints on individual behavior in order to satisfy the mutual needs of its members. Thus.
laws must be general and impersonal).
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an alienation, in the sense of being uprooted or losing the feeling of
belonging. The role of law in this regard reflects the philosophical
concept which originated in the word for the legal act in the common
law. 34 We find in law, then, a means of interpreting such alienation
as an estrangement from the social order of others. In essence, the
person is reduced to a represented legal form which is referred to as
the whole of legal experience. 35 The distinctive mode of the Western
legal person's being tells us about the relationship between law and
society as it is experienced.
It has been argued that the legal form of the person, as a citizen
relative to the state, as a consumer relative to capitalism, and as a
producer of surplus value relative to the powerful few, reflects the
commodity form. In another way, legal experience, is reduced to
polarities by the idea of the legal person as object of the rule. Thus,
laws act to direct behavior, but are subjects of the system, for the
laws are not divine or natural. This concept conveys the sense of
positive law in a political, rather than economic, context. 36 But what
is common to both conceptions is the coordination of self, others and
whole in terms of personal relationships (contracts, torts) and relationships to things (property) as a constitutional process, which process asserts a person's legal attributes of both status and rights. In
this way, property means not just land, labor, and commodities, but
other people. As the language of rights liberates some individuals,
its application alienates others.
The conception of law as the experience of social order and
as
a way of being reveals new property, group and community standards,
and a new relationship to it, by way of rights. Property is thus inherent
in oneself as an individual. Unfortunately, since the essential attribute
of legal personality is the possession of rights, these same rights create
in each person a sense of separateness. They alienate us from each
other because we are alienated from ourselves, insofar as the essence
34. See Dove, Alienation and the Concept of Modernity, 5 ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA
187, 189 (1976). The German word for "alienations" was a translation of the English legal
term for the release of a thing to another. The word now has many more connotations in
English because of this German pedigree.
35. Northrop, The Comparative Philosophy of ComparativeLaw, 45 CORNELL L.Q.
617, 642-44, 648-49, 654-56 (1960).
36. Balbus, Commodity Form and Legal Form: An Essay on the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 11 LAW & Soc'y REV. 571 (1976); Warrington, Pashukauis and the Commodity Form Theory, 9 INr'LJ. Soc. L. 1,5-9 (1981). Sabine, The Two DemocraticTraditions,
61 PHIL. REV. 451, 471 (1952). Stein, Bentham, Austin and the German Pandectists, in
CONTINENTAL INFLUENCE ON ENGLISH LEGAL THOUGHT 1600-1900 at 1119 (1977).
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of ourselves as beings in law means we have rights.
Similarly, we are alienated from an international society because
the person in international law is the state, and its property means its
territory or assets. Comparative law does have far to go in the unification of law or agreement on general principles. But the topic of
international human rights engenders group and community standards. Comparative law must open up the possibility of a discourse
concerning law and society that overcomes the alienating effects of
thinking in terms of norms, rules, or rights. It is important that we
do not overlook the possibility of a common order underlying the
diversity of law because of the way progress forces us to see other
legal systems, or that we ignore it because we think of law as being
given. Particularly in international society's existence we are still
free to mold law to suit our way of existence, rather than taking it in
the form of a normative structure, system of rules, divine plan, or
process of official behavior. To apply the insights of law as a system
of social order on an international scale necessitates a conceptual
framework for the nature of legal experience."'
Such a framework must avoid the obvious pitfalls of applying
the characteristics of a particular system to the whole of legal experience. Likewise, such a framework must not presume an essence to
law. Thus, the polar opposites of consent/coercion, authority/power,
or autonomy/dependence cannot account for their tension, their balance, and their mutual interaction when these opposites are perceived
as parts of the relationship of law to society from the viewpoint of
the person in law. Similarly, the classification of historical circumstance as a dynamic of status/contract, rational/irrational or formal/substantive reduces the overall complex of society as an accomodation of self, other, and whole into a partial and misleading pattern
of characteristics, rather than essence. In the latter, all we see is the
law's self-concept contrasted with its coherence over time. In the
former, all we see is the law in its external relationship to the whole
analyzed as if the law were transcendental to history. These two
approaches (the historically contingent and analytically formal) can
only be brought together if we consider the effect of law on our
experience in society. We must think of how the law appears to us,
how it is maintained and how it realizes itself. The conceptual framework of law for the study of comparative legal systems must include
the aspects of law's appearance in social order in relation to religion,
37.

Cf. Kamba, supra note 3, at 518.
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politics, and ethics; the qualities of law's maintenance, whether original, reflective, or actual; and the realities of law's processes, substance, and ideals.3 8 Comparing law cannot take place with regard
to only the rules or the reasoning of a legal system, nor to its justification or self-image, whether historical or philosophical, for this
type of comparison still assumes a sense to law. The jurist's conception of the law is experienced as already given, and the theorist's
conception is found in the experience of the observer. The task of
Comparative Legal Systems is to get an overview that is not oversimplified. The overview should combine the realities of the rules
and forms of law, the forces that constitute and determine the law,
and the historical and philosophical underpinnings of these forces,
with the question: What does one's way of being in such a system
of law mean? The significance of one's experience of law cannot be
reduced to concepts such as community or solidarity, because the
experience is a process, not a simple concept. Moreover, the nature
of this process is personal, as well as institutional or official. Thus,
the overview deals with the interrelatedness of self, others, and whole
as the simple fact of social order in the world, but it does not assume
any particular conception of law.
The aspects of law show how law presents itself as a part of the
overall social order. The experience of self with others constitutes
ethics, i.e., we should do unto others as they do unto us. On the
other hand, the relationship of others to the whole constitutes politics. Generalized group interests represent the self's actual needs in
the political realm. Moreover, the person is represented by the process as a citizen, an abstraction which necessitates that the personal
self be subsumed into a public self, which acts toward the whole
in a civil or civic fashion on behalf of others. The relationship of
the whole to the unknown (and unknowable) constitutes
38. LePaulle, supra note 17, at 852-53, refers to "recoupement" as a method of
verifying a hypothesis by successive observations of the same phenomena from different
angles. The author believes that what the realities of law reveal transcend any particular
essence of cause, form, end or nature because law is not turned through the axis of its own
content, usefulness, or self-conception, but rather is turned on the axes of givenness and
openness and their reversibility from the point of view of the individual person. By methodically examining comparative law in terms of the interaction of perspective and field of
study, law is a phenomenon that we experience through the dimensions of appearance,
maintenance and realization, of which law is a way of being. Cf. Gabel, Reification in
Legal Reasoning, 3 RESEARCH L. & Soc. 25 (1980). Gabel, Intention and Structure in
Contractual Conditions: Outline of a Method of Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV.
601 (1977).
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religion. Finally, the relationship between self and the social whole
constitutes law. Thus, law's responsibility is to universalize particulars, and its claim depends on whether its universality can be particularized to the self. This classification gives us a way of looking
at the whole of social order, and comparing types of authority according to whether certain relationships dominate. Thus, classical
Confucianism exemplifies the moral authority of interpersonal relationships. In modem Islamic nations, such as Saudi Arabia, the authority of their social order still depends on the religious relationship
of the State to the will of Allah. Western democracies are political
social orders in which the authority of the whole depends on its
relationship to the public, although the United States' emphasis on
both individual and constitutional rights, on judicial review, and on
the separation of powers, reveals the fact that the authority of its social
order also depends on whether the whole meets interpersonal needs.
Basically, there are only two general types of authority: the
politico-legal and the religico-ethical. This dichotomy should make
clear that the classification is only intended to analyze the interplay
between self-others-whole, and not to characterize any particular social order in an essential way. For example, law partakes of religious,
ethical, and political relationships. However, if we view the law as
being concerned with a different kind of experience other than the
forces of social order, then this perception suggests some interesting
aspects of the law. In politico-legal social order, the whole is central. In a religico-ethical social order, self-others-whole and the unknown lie in a continuum. In the former system, authority is focused
in the form of the whole, and law's contribution to that whole. In
the latter, authority is diffuse, and law overlaps with all other means
of social order. In this manner, religico-ethical social orders have
clearly defined group membership. They do not tolerate deviance
because the sense of inner conviction and normativity is greater,
although the need for institutionalization is less. On the other hand,
there is a tension in law between the implicit ordering of principle,
mediation, and custom because the form of the whole does not predominate. Individualism, deviance, and dissent as between self, others, and the unknown are easily tolerated in the politico-legal system
because ethics, law and religion all come together in the form of the
whole. However, the whole must be clearly defined as distinct from
subjective ethics, transcendentalism, and natural law. This distinction is accomplished through the resolution of the relationship between
law and morality, the delineation of the nature of legal obligation,
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and the definition of the meaning of justice as welfare. These are
.the definitional questions of recent Anglo-American common law
legal theory. Therefore, law actually concerns the relationship of the
whole to the self, rather than the relationship of the self to the
whole. The above three questions of modern legal theory reflect a
positivistic distortion of the relationship between self and whole. This
distortion illustrates much of the preceding discussion concerning the
reduction of the person in law to the legal person, and the consequent
loss of any sense of the experience of law.
Now that the aspect that law presents relative to the whole of
social order can be seen, the next level of comparison focuses on the
qualities of law itself. These qualities will vary according to whether
the type of order is religico-ethical or politico-legal, and the role of
law in the order. What is needed is some means to describe how
law's role is legitimated and justified, that is, how law maintains itself
as part of the experience of the participants in the social order, but
without reducing the process to one of consent, coercion, or coherence. Thus, law may be justified according to the basic plan or vision
of the social order, i.e., its original quality. Law may also be justified
according to its accomodation of interests, desires, and needs, i.e.,
its reflective quality. Lastly, law may be justified by reference to its
relevance to the conditions and circumstances of the particular time
and place, i.e., its actual quality. Although none of these qualities
alone is likely to be an essential characteristic of a legal system, the
balance and proportionality among them are significant. Essentially,
the question is whether the basic principles or values of the law, as
part of the whole social order, legitimate it; or whether the results of
the application of the law are the source of its legitimacy. A basic
difference can be drawn at once. In a religico-social order, the emphasis upon the role of law throughout the continuum of experience
of self-whole-others means that the actual quality of law, in terms of
its fit with the particular situation, is the basic justification of law. 39
In the politico-legal social order, there is an obvious tension
between the justification of law by its conformity with social practices,
and its reference to basic principles, such as equal respect. Dworkin
39. Rosen, Equity and Discretion in a Modern Islamic Legal System, 15 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 217, 240-43 (1980). Weber referred to this as "Kadijustiz," implying its basis to be
individual expediency. Rosen's article shows the definite regularities implicit in a one-byone ad hoc determination. The author believes that these regularities are different from the
rules' content reflecting social values or interests, and from the system as a whole expressing
certain fundamental values.
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argues for the priority of the original quality. He says that law does
not necessarily reflect social practices, nor is it justified by
them. Instead, law is attained through the interpretation of principles,
and serves to justify social practices. 40 To this extent, there is a
connection in law with the whole system rather than with the ethics
of self or others. Therefore, this political conception of law draws a
distinction between social democracy and democratic liberalism. In
the latter, the reflective quality predominates, and in the former, the
original quality predominates. The difference is not simply between
a balancing of interests in the application of rules and the basic principles to which the rules and the balancing test must refer because
the original quality of law (the basic principles of the system as a part
of the whole) means that the law need not only be consensus-oriented
but also not result-oriented in the particular case. Law is autonomous
from the personal and the interpersonal. However, if the reflective
quality of law is used to justify the maintenance of the law, its actual
application and coherence in the instance, and its fit and coherence
with basic principles, are also relevant. For this reason, Dworkin
overemphasizes the argument that the law need not reflect social
practices and is not constituted by them, but in fact serves to justify
them. He distorts the complexity of the experience of the maintenance
of law. His is an institutional, professional, and systematic perspective which ultimately serves only to obscure the overall aspects of
law as a part of the social order by identifying it with the political
whole.

41

What is important is the way law originates, reflects and actualizes itself in the context of society as a whole. We cannot simply
view other legal systems as coercive when they are compared with
our own. Meaningful comparison proceeds according to the relative
weight given to principles, practices, and the practicalities.
Equally misleading is the representation of coercion, consent, or
coherence by ideas such as a habit of obedience, an official rule of
recognition, or the convergence of social practices. Each objectifies
the mutual interaction of the qualities of law into a single essential
quality. From the viewpoint of comparative legal systems, this
40. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855, 867 (1972).
41. This is a separate topic. It involves Dworkin's theory as a whole and the politics
of jurisprudence as both the study of political society and the absence of a social theory of
law. See Hicks, Dworkin, Society and the Politics of Jurisprudence, 12 REVUE DE DROIT
UNIVERSITE SHERBROOKE

483 (1982).
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representation can only lead to a judgmental attitude. From the viewpoint of jurisprudence, this representation removes the personal dimension from law.
Finally, when comparing legal systems one explores the realities
of the law, in terms of its content and substance, its process, and its
ideals. These realities reveal the differences in the sources of law,
types of law, methods of judicial review, and methods of truth finding
among varieties of legal systems. But if the subject of the comparison
includes not just the forms and functions of law, but its forces and
processes of development, and also its historical and philosophical
implications, then some means of orienting one's approach to the
whole social order is necessary. Thus, the significance of codification, the structure of administrative courts, or the reliance on religious
leaders for counsel, is seen in the context of how the law is justified,
and how the law reveals itself in the entire social order. The overall
comparison of the aspects, qualities, and realities of legal systems
enables differences in legal families to be accounted for in the overall
framework.
The total overview of comparative law suggested above can be
dealt with through the means of this framework of the aspects, qualities
and realities of law. It provides a very useful pedagogical device for
an overview without fragmentation, and for insight without superficiality. What we really see is how law is experienced between the
given aspect and the open aspect of its existence. To the extent
comparative law can reveal the universality of the experience of law
as a way of being in society relative to other means of social order,
we may yet dream of a world law. But our alienation is rooted in
the loss of this sense of the experience of law to a political and not
wholly social, interpersonal and personal account of the bonds that
unite us.

